A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. The 2001 declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, commits the member governments to negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access with a view to phasing out export subsidies, while embracing "special and di¤erential treatment" for developing countries as an integral part of all elements of the negotiations. The main message of this paper comes in three parts. First, these stated aims are incompatible from the perspective of our economic analysis; thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks. Second, in attempting to integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, the WTO may face a "latecomers"problem that, while occurring also in earlier rounds, is unprecedented in its scale in the Doha Round, and which could potentially account for the current impasse. And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the non-reciprocal special-anddi¤erential treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha, to address the latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.
Introduction
A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations is to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. Toward this objective, the declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, November 14, 2001 , states in part:
"We commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. We agree that special and di¤erential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations...".
Currently, the Doha Round is approaching the end of its 10th year of negotiations, and the Round seems unlikely to conclude in the foreseeable future with an agreement that achieves its fundamental objectives.
What can account for the lack of progress in the Doha Round? Are there changes in the approach to negotiations that was endorsed at Doha that might help to break the current impasse?
In this paper, we extract insights from the standard economic theory of trade agreements to provide answers to these questions. Our main message comes in three parts.
First, the stated aims of the Doha Round are incompatible from the perspective of our economic analysis. Thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks.
Second, after 50 years of successful developed-country liberalization under GATT (the WTO's predecessor), the WTO may face a "latecomers"problem as it attempts to integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, wherein its developed country members face a kind of "globalization fatigue" and have insu¢ cient bargaining power in the negotiations relative to developing country members. While this problem also arose in earlier GATT rounds, its scale in the Doha Round is unprecedented, and it could potentially account for the current impasse.
And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the nonreciprocal special-and-di¤erential treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha, to address the latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.
To make these points, we rely on a series of simple general equilibrium and partial equilibrium trade models. For the most part, we illustrate the message delivered by these models with the use of schematic …gures, providing references to the existing literature for more complete and formal treatments. And we support our use of the models with reference to the relevant empirical research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we consider the implications of special and di¤erential treatment for developing countries in the context of a negotiating forum where developed countries engage in reciprocal and non-discriminatory tari¤ bargaining. In section 3 we turn to an analysis of the Doha approach to agriculture negotiations. Section 4 considers how the Doha Round might be made a development round according to the economic analysis contained in the previous sections. Finally, section 5 o¤ers a brief conclusion. A Data Appendix includes a number of tables not included in the main body of the paper.
Non-reciprocal negotiations and developing countries
A key objective of the current Doha Round of GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations is to bring developing countries into the world trading system. A wide range of anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that developing countries have gained little if at all from more than half a century of GATT/WTO-sponsored tari¤ negotiations. For example, based on interviews with WTO delegates and Secretariat sta¤ members, Jawara and Kwa (2003, p. 269 ) o¤er the following assessment:
"Developed countries are bene…tting from the WTO, as are a handful of (mostly upper) middle-income countries. The rest, including the great majority of developing countries, are not. It is as simple as that."
The empirical …ndings of Subramanian and Wei (2007) are also consistent with this position. They …nd that GATT/WTO membership is associated with a large and signi…cant increase in trade volumes for developed countries; however, for developing country members, the impact of membership on trade volumes is weak or non-existent. 1 One fact to keep in mind is that, while developed countries have negotiated deep reductions in their nondiscriminatory "most-favored-nation"(MFN) tari¤s under GATT auspices, developing countries have committed to few tari¤ cuts over the 8 GATT multilateral negotiating rounds that span 50 years. In the Data Appendix we reproduce four relevant tables taken from the WTO World Trade Report for 2007. Table 5 records the impressive overall results from 60 years of negotiated tari¤ reductions under GATT and the …rst decade of the WTO (created in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round). Table 9 then con…rms that these overall results mask a striking lack of tari¤ commitments ("binding coverage") for developing countries prior to the last completed (Uruguay) GATT round, while Appendix Tables 8 and 9 record the much more signi…cant tari¤ bindings made by developed countries over the GATT years. 2 The asymmetry in GATT/WTO tari¤ commitments across developed and developing countries is a result of the exception to the reciprocity norm that has been extended to developing countries and codi…ed under "special and di¤erential treatment," or SDT, clauses. This exception was thought to ensure that developing countries would get a "free pass" on the MFN tari¤ cuts that the developed countries negotiated with one another, allowing developing country exporters to then share with exporters from developed countries in the bene…ts of greater MFN access to developed country markets. Apparently, though, negotiations among developed countries have not generated a signi…cant impact on the trade volumes of developing country members of GATT/WTO.
Why hasn't GATT/WTO membership generated the anticipated trade-volume impact for developing countries? One possible explanation is that developed countries have found ways around the MFN principle, so that their tari¤ bargaining in fact discriminates against non-participating GATT/WTO members. Bown's (2004) …ndings, however, weigh against this explanation. He …nds that countries do indeed abide by the MFN principle, at least in the context of GATT/WTO bilateral dispute settlement negotiations. 3 Here, we explore a di¤erent explanation, namely, that the non-reciprocal approach anchored in SDT itself lies behind the absence of meaningful trade gains for developing countries. Since the non-reciprocal approach is also a feature of the current Doha negotiations, our explanation suggests that these negotiations may also be structured in a way that will fail to generate appreciable impact on the trade volumes of developing country members of GATT/WTO.
The Problem with SDT
Two distinct and potentially complementary arguments linking SDT clauses to the disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO may be identi…ed. A …rst argument is straightforward: SDT may have given developing countries a free pass to the tari¤ liberalization negotiated by developed countries, but it took away their voice in determining which developed country markets were liberalized through GATT/WTO negotiations, with the predictable result that the developed-country markets that were traditionally the most important to developing countries (e.g., textiles and apparel, certain agricultural products, footwear) experienced the least negotiated trade liberalization under GATT/WTO auspices. Finger (1979) is a strong advocate of this argument, and notes that a small number of active developing country participants in the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations (1964-67) served as "the exception that proves the rule": "Unfortunately, the third world and its spokespersons and institutions have taken a vocal position against a reciprocal role for LDCs. The Kennedy Round, however, provides strong evidence that reciprocity pays. There, the United States made concessions (almost entirely tari¤ reductions) on $571 million or 33 percent of its (1964) imports from the nine active LDC participants...Of some $6 billion of U.S. imports in 1964 from other LDCs, only 5 percent was subject to concessions." Finger (1979, p. 435) In addition to the evidence cited by Finger, some indirect evidence for the relevance of this …rst argument in helping to explain the weak trade e¤ects of GATT/WTO membership for developing countries can be found in the implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which was introduced as an SDT provision of GATT under the "Enabling Clause" for developing countries. Under GSP, it was hoped that developing countries might bene…t from unilateral grants of preferential market access by developed countries. But the unilateral nature of these market access commitments has in practice limited their impact on developing country trade (see, for example, Ozden and Reinhardt, 2005) . As Grossman and Sykes (2005) describe, this limited impact has occurred because developed countries have inevitably implemented their GSP programs in a way that minimizes the potential political costs to themselves (e.g., by exempting from GSP eligibility politically sensitive sectors such as certain textiles and apparel products, footwear and certain agricultural products) and/or have introduced reciprocity in other forms (e.g., by o¤ering tari¤ preferences in exchange for measures to combat drug tra¢ cking). And …nally, in the context of GATT/WTO MFN tari¤ commitments, which is our focus here, this …rst argument …nds some direct empirical support in Subramanian and Wei (2007) . We will return to this argument later in the paper.
But this …rst argument misses the "free pass"logic that was supposed to capture the anticipated bene…ts of SDT in the context of MFN tari¤ bargaining. That logic was never based on the hope that developed countries would o¤er unilateral MFN tari¤ reductions on products where developing countries were the principal export suppliers to their markets. Instead, as described above, the logic of SDT was that developing country exporters could "free ride" on the reciprocal liberalization e¤orts of others; that is, together with exporters from developed countries, developing country exporters would enjoy trade bene…ts from the MFN tari¤ cuts that the developed countries negotiated with one another. Central to this logic is the existence of developed and developing country exporters who compete with each other for sales to developed country markets on products that fall within a given tari¤ line, but competing exporters play no role in the argument we have just described. It is this role that we highlight in a second argument linking the SDT clause to the disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO.
To develop this second argument, we begin by sketching a simple general equilibrium model of trade in two goods between three countries. Suppose that the home country imports good x from foreign countries 1 and 2, and that the two foreign countries import good y from the home country, with all goods produced in perfectly competitive markets and each country imposing a tari¤ on its imports. For simplicity, we assume that the two foreign countries do not trade with one another; notice, though, that they are competing exporters of good x into the home country market. We denote the local relative prices in the home and foreign countries as p p x =p y and p i p i x =p i y , respectively, where we use an asterisk to denote foreign country variables and where i = 1; 2. The home country selects an ad valorem and non-discriminatory (i.e., MFN) tari¤ rate, t, for imports The world price for trade between the home country and foreign country i is p wi p i x =p y . Notice that p wi is thus foreign country i's terms of trade. De…ning 1 + t and 1 + t i ; we have that p = p wi and p i = (1= i )p wi . Since the home country applies a non-discriminatory tari¤,
we thus see that p w1 = p w2 p w ; that is, the two foreign countries must share the same terms of trade when the home country adopts an MFN tari¤ policy. We thus have that p = p w and
Finally, we note that the home country's terms of trade in this MFN setting is given as 1=p w :
In a given country, once the local and world prices are determined, all economic quantities (production, consumption, tari¤ revenue, imports, exports) are also determined. In turn, for a given set of tari¤s, ( ; 1 ; 2 ), once we determine a market-clearing world price, e p w ( ; 1 ; 2 ), then all local prices are determined. This follows since the pricing relationships just presented then yield the local prices as p( ; e p w ) = e p w and p i ( i ; e p w ) = (1= i )e p w , respectively. Finally, the market-clearing world price is determined as the world price which ensures that the home-country imports of good x equals the sum of exports of good x from foreign countries 1 and 2; in other words, e p w ( ; 1 ; 2 ) is the value for p w which solves
As is standard, for each country, we assume as well that import and export functions are de…ned in a manner that satis…es trade balance requirements:
where E(p; p w ) denotes home-country exports of good y and M i (p i ; p w ) represents foreign-countryi imports of good y. The market clearing requirement for good y is then implied by (1) and (2).
We assume that each of these three countries is "large,"in the traditional sense that a change in the country's tari¤ results in a change in the market-clearing world price. We emphasize, though, that for some countries the resulting world-price change may be small in size; that is, some countries may be much less large than are others. We assume that prices depend on tari¤s in the "standard"
manner. Thus, a country achieves a terms of trade gain when it raises its own import tari¤:
Likewise, when a country raises its import tari¤, the local price of the import good relative to the export good rises in that country:
Intuitively, if a country raises its import tari¤, then some of the incidence is borne by foreign exporters, who receive a lower export price for their product, and some of the incidence is passed on to domestic consumers, who pay a high local price for the imported good. We will discuss below speci…c evidence relating to the ability of importing countries to impose the incidence of tari¤s on foreign exporters, but here we note that there is strong evidence that the incidence of trade costs more generally are borne disproportionately by exporters. For example, according to a recent paper by Anderson and Yotov (2010) , sellers/exporters bear a signi…cant portion of trade costs relative to buyers/importers, with exporters'incidence in the early 1990's roughly 5 times larger than that borne by importers according to Anderson and Yotov's estimates.
Having sketched the general equilibrium model of trade, let us now return to the discussion above and consider the possibility that the home country and foreign country 1 negotiate a reciprocal reduction in import tari¤s while foreign country 2 takes a "free pass"and leaves its tari¤ unaltered.
What can we say about the implications of this negotiation for foreign country 2's volume of trade?
To address this question, we place two restrictions on the negotiation between the home country and foreign country 1: First, the home country tari¤ satis…es the MFN requirement. This restriction is already imposed in the description of the model. Second, the negotiation satis…es the principle of reciprocity for the home country and foreign country 1. 
where
. 4 Under GATT/WTO rules, trade liberalization negotiations are not required to satisfy the principle of reciprocity. It is frequently observed, however, that countries seek to obtain a "balance of concessions" in their negotiations. We may thus understand the principle of reciprocity as a negotiation norm. While more evidence is needed before the empirical issue is settled, we note that some recent studies (Shirono, 2004; Limao, 2006 Limao, , 2007 Karacaovali and Limao, 2008) provide empirical support for the view that actual tari¤ bargaining outcomes in the GATT/WTO conform to a reciprocity norm.
Following Staiger (1999, 2005) , we now use the balanced trade condition (2) for foreign country 1, which must hold both at the initial tari¤s and the new tari¤s, to rewrite the reciprocity condition (5) as
Using (6), we thus see that mutual changes in trade policy for the home country and foreign country 1 satisfy the principle of reciprocity if and only if they leave the world price unchanged. When countries reduce tari¤s in a manner that satis…es the principle of reciprocity, therefore, they achieve higher trade volumes even though their terms of trade are unaltered. 5 The higher trade volumes arise entirely as a consequence of the induced changes in local prices in each negotiating country.
We are now in position to consider the implications of this negotiation for foreign country 2's volume of trade. The main …nding is that foreign country 2 experiences no change in its trade volume, when the home country and foreign country 1 exchange tari¤ reductions that satisfy the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. To establish this …nding, we observe …rst that foreign country 2's terms of trade, e p w ; are unaltered. The principle of non-discrimination ensures that foreign country 2 enjoys the same terms of trade as does foreign country 1, and as argued just above the principle of reciprocity in turn ensures that foreign country 1's terms of trade are unaltered by the negotiated reduction in tari¤s. A second observation is that foreign country 2's local price, p 2 ( 2 ; e p w ), is also unaltered. This follows since foreign country 2's terms of trade are unaltered and foreign country 2 does not undertake a tari¤ change of its own. With its world and local prices unchanged, foreign country 2 thus experiences no change in its production, consumption, tari¤ revenue, imports or exports.
This …nding is perhaps surprising, since as Figure 1 re ‡ects and as we have emphasized, foreign country 2 receives a (non-discriminatory) tari¤ cut from the home country. How can a country experience no change in its trade volume, when the import tari¤ of its trading partner is reduced 4 As we explain below in footnote 7, if the described change in tari¤s satis…es the principle of reciprocity from the perspective of foreign country 1, then the tari¤ change also satis…es the principle of reciprocity from the perspective of the home country.
5 If the home country were to violate MFN and adopt discriminatory tari¤s, then its bilateral terms of trade with foreign country 1 would di¤er from its bilateral terms of trade with foreign country 2. The home country's multilateral terms of trade might then change even when a negotiated tari¤ change with foreign country 1 preserves its bilateral terms of trade with foreign country 1. We assume here, though, that the home country adopts non-discriminatory tari¤s, and so the home country's bilateral and multilateral terms of trade are all represented by a common expression, 1=e p w . See Staiger (1999, 2005) for further discussion.
and it o¤ers no tari¤ cut of its own? The key point is that the negotiation between the home country and foreign country 1 alters the local price in foreign country 1. Following the reciprocal tari¤ reduction, the local price of the import good relative to the export good in foreign country 1 must fall (i.e., p 1 must rise). As a consequence, consumers in foreign country 1 substitute consumption toward the import good and away from the export good, and resources for production shift from the import good toward the export good. For both of these reasons, when foreign country 1 cuts its import tari¤, its export volume (production minus consumption of the export good) rises. 6 The principle of reciprocity then has the e¤ect of ensuring that the expansion in export volume from foreign country 1 exactly satis…es the increased demand for imports coming from the home country. In other words, foreign country 2's hope of a "free pass"to greater export volume is thwarted by the fact that, while the home country now o¤ers a more open market on a non-discriminatory basis to all comers, foreign country 2 must compete for sales in that market with a more "high-export-performing" foreign country 1. And in policy circles, the fact that a country's import tari¤s act to impede its exports has been recognized for decades. For example, in describing the forces that led to the demise of the import substitution policies popular in the developing countries of Latin America in the 1950s and 60s, Dornbusch (1992) writes:
In the late 1960s and 1970s, protection in developing countries softened in at least one direction. Many countries recognized that protection by tari¤s and quotas did keep imports out, but that the resulting decline in demand for foreign exchange also led to an appreciation of the currency and hence a severe tax on exports of both traditional commodities and emerging industrial goods. Unstable real exchange rates added to the hazards of export activities. Moreover, duties on imported intermediate goods …rst implied a tax on export activities using these goods, and then helped cause a currency overvaluation which hurt export competitiveness of these products. (pp. 71-72)
The novelty in our argument above is simply to develop the implications of the import-tari¤s-impede-exports observation in a competing exporter setting of reciprocal MFN tari¤ bargaining. 10 9 There is also related evidence on the link between own tari¤s and industry-level productivity. For example, Tre ‡er (2004) examines the impact of Canadian tari¤ concessions in the Canadian-US free trade agreement and reports that Canada's own tari¤ cuts raised labor productivity in Canada by 15 percent in the most impacted, import-competing group of industries, thereby quantifying a large and positive industry-level productivity e¤ect associated with owntari¤ cuts.
1 0 The observation that a country's import barriers act to impede its exports should be distinguished from the question of whether a country's import barriers impede its growth. This openness-growth linkage is at the center of the debate over the validity of the so-called "Washington Consensus" and has come under intense criticism over the past decade (for a recent contribution to this debate, see Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2008) . By contrast, the basic link between a country's import barriers and its exports which we highlight in our discussion above is widely accepted, and is not part of the debate over the Washington Consensus.
SDT and the Doha Round
What are the implications of this discussion for the Doha Round? Here we emphasize two. The …rst implication is that Doha's largely non-reciprocal approach, still anchored in a long GATT tradition of SDT, is unlikely to deliver meaningful trade gains for developing countries, just as this approach did not do so over the previous half century. Rather, substantial trade-volume gains for developing countries from negotiated trade liberalization can be achieved most e¤ectively if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed nations. 11 This implication seems to run counter to much current thinking on the Doha Round. For example, the recently released Bhagwati-Sutherland Report (2011) states: "...The expectation that in most cases developing countries should be entitled to ‡exibilities in the application of tari¤ cuts that are not available to developed WTO states has also followed from the widening of the membership and the development of a body of thinking about the pace and depth of liberalization that is appropriate for developing countries. This assumption -that a development friendly trade deal must demand less of countries in a way that is proportionate to their state of development -permeates the Doha Round and the …nal package will rightly have to be measured against it.
"This means that developed countries have to accept that the outcome will be asymmetrical, even vis-a-vis large and competitive exporters like China and Brazil who remain in development." (p. 6).
Our discussion above is at odds with this position, and suggests that, rather than accepting and embracing the non-reciprocal approach embodied in SDT as an appropriate standard for the Doha Round, the success of the Doha Round as a Development Round may hinge on rejecting SDT as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO. 12 1 1 In this regard, a limited opportunity to gauge the potential trade impacts for a developing country when it cuts its tari¤s in a reciprocal fashion in a WTO negotiation is provided by accession negotiations that occurred during and after the Uruguay Round, because strict adherence to SDT was not followed in accession negotiations over this period, and instead existing developed country members asked for more-or-less reciprocal commitments from new member countries as a condition for membership. Subramanian and Wei (2007) exploit this di¤erence in membership requirements across old (pre-Uruguay Round) and new (post-Uruguay Round) developing country GATT/WTO members, and …nd that developing countries who were asked to make more nearly reciprocal tari¤ cuts of their own in exchange for WTO membership did indeed enjoy greater trade e¤ects of membership than developing countries who were allowed to not reciprocate under SDT. We also note that the …rst implication we emphasize above shares much with Finger's (1979, pp. 437-8) suggestion regarding a possible method for better integrating less-developed countries (LDCs) into the GATT: "An approach to consider is a return to the format of the old reciprocal trade negotiations, concentrating, however, on exchanges between a major industrial country and its major LDC trading partners. The feasibility of such an approach depends on there being substantial bilateral, principal supplier trade ‡ows between the proposed participants that are subject to negotiable trade restrictions." 1 2 As will become clear below, to the extent that a developing country is truly "small" in its relevant markets, it should not be expected to o¤er tari¤ concessions in a trade agreement according to the terms-of-trade theory; but this observation holds equally for developed countries, and therefore provides no rationale for an SDT-type norm applied to developing countries (see Staiger, 2006 , for an elaboration on some of these themes as they relate to developing
The second, and more speculative, implication concerns the manner in which negotiations must proceed if developing countries are to bene…t (i.e., advance their own objectives). To develop this implication, we must dig somewhat deeper and consider the purpose of a trade agreement.
According to the terms-of-trade theory, the purpose of trade agreements is to facilitate an escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners'Dilemma. In the absence of a trade agreement, governments would set optimal unilateral trade policies. For the government of a large country, a higher import tari¤ raises the local relative price of the import good and also lowers the relative price of the import good on the world market. This latter e¤ect means that a higher import tari¤ improves the importing country's terms of trade and results in a deterioration of the terms of trade for the exporting country. A higher import tari¤ from a large country thus imposes a negative terms-oftrade externality on its trading partner, whose exporters receive a lower world price. Governments fail to internalize this externality in the absence of a trade agreement, and as a consequence tari¤s are higher than would be e¢ cient, where e¢ ciency is measured relative to government preferences.
Starting from this ine¢ cient outcome, governments can then gain from a trade agreement in which they reciprocally lower tari¤s. The gains come from eliminating the local-price distortions that arise under unilateral tari¤ setting when foreign exporters pay part of the cost of domestic import protection.
A growing body of evidence provides support for the key features of this theory. 13 We mention here four sets of …ndings. First, Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence that even seemingly "small" countries (and many developing countries) are large in some markets and that unilateral tari¤ setting responds to cost-shifting incentives where countries are large. Second, Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011) …nd that the pattern of GATT/WTO negotiated tari¤ cuts is consistent with the elimination of the cost-shifting component of unilateral tari¤s. Third, empirical work by Ludema and Mayda (2010) indicates that GATT/WTO tari¤ bindings exhibit remnants of a cost-shifting component where one would expect to …nd such remnants, given MFN and the pattern of non-reciprocity. And …nally, Eicher and Henn (2011) …nd that the trade e¤ects associated with WTO membership are largest for countries that were large in world markets at the time of their accession to the GATT/WTO (and hence would be expected to have a signi…cant cost-shifting component in their unilateral tari¤s and therefore to negotiate large tari¤ reductions in the GATT/WTO according to the terms-of-trade theory).
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements thus suggests that developing countries stand to gain from reciprocal trade liberalization wherever they are big enough that foreign exporters countries and the WTO). In essence, according to the terms-of-trade theory, it is the biggest countries -whether developed or developing -who adopt unilateral trade policies that are the most internationally ine¢ cient, and hence it is the biggest countries that should negotiate the most substantial tari¤ bindings under an internationally e¢ cient trade agreement. Also, our discussion of SDT has been couched in terms of an escape from the reciprocity norm in the context of tari¤ bindings and market access negotiations, but as we have noted there are a number of SDT clauses throughout the GATT/WTO. For example, a major sticking point in the Doha Round that contributed to the breakdown of negotiations in 2008 was the special agricultural safeguard mechanism for developing countries, a provision which re ‡ects the SDT clause. The implications we discuss here would be relevant for these other instances of non-reciprocal SDT clauses as well.
1 3 See Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for a recent survey.
"feel the pain" of their tari¤s (i.e., care about access to their markets). When this is true, foreign countries are motivated to engage with the developing country and identify mutually bene…cial and reciprocal tari¤ reductions. Returning to our earlier discussion of the two arguments linking SDT clauses to the disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO, we now observe that these two arguments have starkly di¤erent implications for the manner in which negotiations should proceed in the Doha Round.
Consider …rst the argument that, where developing countries have traditionally been the principal export suppliers into developed country markets (e.g., textiles and apparel, certain agricultural products, footwear), SDT has simply resulted in a lack of GATT/WTO sponsored liberalization in developed country markets because it has prevented the liberalizing forces of reciprocity from taking hold. Here the implications of our discussion for the Doha Round are simple: reject SDT, and let reciprocal bargaining between developed and developing countries do for developed-country market access in these sectors what has already been achieved for manufactured goods more generally through reciprocal bargaining between developed countries. In this case, each government involved in the reciprocal negotiations stands to gain in the standard way, i.e., from the elimination of local-price distortions that arise under unilateral tari¤ setting when foreign exporters pay part of the cost of domestic import protection. 14 Next consider the second argument linking SDT clauses to the disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO that we discussed above, which applies to the competing exporter case. Here there is an important di¤erence: it is now relevant that reciprocal bargaining between developed countries has gone on for over 50 years; and as a result, developed country tari¤s on most manufactured goods (which account for almost 90% of world merchandise exports) are already very low. Developing countries would therefore be "latecomers" to the tari¤ bargaining arena for these products, and a potential concern is then that developed countries may have already eliminated local-price distortions in these markets through previous tari¤ negotiations. In other words, given the existing tari¤s of developed countries, it may be di¢ cult to identify a substantial set of mutually bene…cial and reciprocal tari¤ bargains with developing countries. This concern is more speculative in nature, but it points to a potential second implication of our discussion: in order to "make room at the table" for developing countries, developed countries may need to …nd a way to in e¤ect renegotiate their existing tari¤ commitments with one another.
1 4 Even in this simplest case, an interesting complication for the Doha Round arises from the fact that the Uruguay Round agreement that led to the elimination of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and hence liberalized market access for textiles and apparel in developed country markets has been interpreted as a reciprocal agreement between developed and developing countries, but the form of the reciprocal commitments made by developing countries was not a market access commitment and instead amounted to accepting commitments associated with the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS commitments are not market access commitments, and arguably they do not have the same own-export-enhancing e¤ects as do tari¤ commitments, and in any case would not reduce local-price distortions in developing countries in the way that traditional market access commitments would. This in turn suggests that the WTO liberalization of textiles and apparel to date may have (i) eliminated much of the local-price distortions for this sector in developed countries, while (ii) not achieving much in the way of eliminating local-price distortions in developing country markets, with the resulting asymmetry between developed and developing countries then exacerbating the "latecomer" problems that we describe next.
In particular, for manufactured goods, developed countries may have already achieved the degree of "openness" that they desire. If this is true, then two issues potentially follow. First, developed countries at this point may have preserved an inadequate amount of bargaining power; speci…cally, developed countries may have little left to o¤er developing countries in reciprocal bargains. This issue naturally complicates any process under which developing countries are to gain through a reciprocal exchange of tari¤ reductions with developed countries. A second issue is that a kind of "globalization fatigue"may be present in the developed world. That is, the existing MFN tari¤s of developed countries may be broadly e¢ cient for these countries in the world trading system as it currently stands, but may be too low for a world in which developing countries are fully integrated into the world trading system. To the extent that these issues arise, one potential solution would be to allow for some degree of renegotiation (upward) of existing tari¤ commitments among developed countries, in order to "make room" for negotiations (downward) with developing countries. 15 The idea would be to …nd a way to facilitate agreement on the set of negotiated tari¤ commitments that the current WTO membership would choose to negotiate today if they were not constrained in their negotiations by their pre-existing tari¤ bindings.
The possibility that developed countries might need to renegotiate their existing tari¤ commitments in order to be able to accommodate the entry of developing countries into the world trading system sounds admittedly extreme and raises a host of issues from which our simple theoretical treatment abstracts. 16 We thus raise this possibility here primarily as a pedagogical device, and we will later suggest that other less extreme sounding possibilities may have much the same e¤ect.
Still, it is important to note that the underlying issues described above are far from new or unfamiliar to trade negotiators. Rather, a struggle with the basic problem of how to accommodate "latecomers" has been in evidence from very early in the GATT/WTO history. The …nding that we report above suggests that if the developed countries were to renegotiate (upward) their existing tari¤ commitments in a manner that satis…es the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, then in principle the trade-volume e¤ects of this renegotiation for other countries could be quite small.
1 6 An obvious worry is that signi…cant renegotiations could trigger an unraveling of previous gains. For example, in the context of a possible slowdown or reversal of the process of negotiated tari¤ liberalization, some observers have noted that the GATT/WTO process seems to accord with the "bicycle theory" of trade agreements: unless you keep peddling, you will fall o¤ (see Bhagwati, 1988, p. 41 , for an early informal statement of the bicycle theory, and Staiger, 1995, and Devereux, 1997 for early attempts to formally model this idea).
stipulate that the binding of a low duty or of duty-free treatment is to be recognized as a concession equivalent in value to the substantial reduction of high tari¤s or the elimination of tari¤ preferences. Some thought that, in observance of this rule, the high-tari¤ countries should make further reductions in their duties in exchange for the prolongation of the binding of low duties. But although the high-tari¤ countries were sometimes willing to o¤er concessions without expecting comparable reductions from countries with low tari¤s, they were not prepared to grant what they considered to be unilateral and unrequited concessions. No general solution was found at Torquay, but the question will be further explored in the near future. Meanwhile, the area of negotiations between some of the European countries was restricted by this divergence of view." (ICITO, 1952, pp. 9-10) .
And on a smaller scale, there is also evidence that the second issue of "globalization fatigue" was already very real at Torquay as well. As E. Wyndham White wrote at the time:
"The Torquay negotiations took place under conditions of much greater stress than those which prevailed at the time of the Geneva or Annecy Conferences. Besides, those earlier negotiations had covered much of the ground, and many of the countries participating at Torquay felt that they had largely exhausted their bargaining power or that they had gone as far as was justi…ed in the process of tari¤ reduction in view of present-day uncertainties. They felt they needed more time to digest and to assess the e¤ects of the concessions already made before making further cuts in their tari¤s." (ICITO, 1952, p. 9 ).
Hence, the issues associated with accommodating latecomers at the bargaining table have posed long-standing challenges for the GATT/WTO. 17 Finally, we note that The Economist also takes the view that the latecomers issue is the central sticking point at Doha: "...the real bone of contention is the aim of proposed cuts in tari¤s on manufactured goods. America sees the Doha talks as its …nal opportunity to get fast-growing emerging economies like China and India to slash their duties on imports of such goods, which have been reduced in previous rounds but remain much higher than those in the rich world.
It wants something approaching parity, at least in some sectors, because it reckons its own low tari¤s leave it with few concessions to o¤er in future talks. But emerging markets insist that the Doha round was never intended to result in such harmonization.
These positions are fundamentally at odds." (April 28, 2011) In fact, in light of the expressed intention of the Doha Round to meaningfully integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, it may be that, as The Economist seems to suggest, it is the latecomers problem, rather than the sheer number of countries involved in the Doha Round, that explains the reason for the current impasse. 18 In their interim report on the Doha Round, Bhagwati and Sutherland (2011) propose a shortterm deadline for the round. In this context, we note that the …rst implication of our analysisthat developing countries must come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed countries -could be implemented over a short time span. Our second and more speculative implication, however, that developed countries may need in e¤ect to renegotiate their existing tari¤ commitments, raises a host of issues beyond our simple model and would appear challenging to implement over a short time span. It is possible, however, to interpret ongoing e¤orts in the Doha negotiations as in e¤ect helping to achieve ends consistent with our second implication, and after considering in the next section the nature of the agriculture negotiations we return to this possibility in section 4.
Agriculture
Another key objective of the current (Doha) round of GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations is to extend GATT/WTO disciplines to the agriculture sector. The central role of this objective is revealed by the prominent e¤orts to reduce agricultural subsidies and by the high-pro…le Doha negotiation failures that have resulted. In the Doha Round so far, the approach has been to encourage negotiations that deliver reductions in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in exchange for reductions in import tari¤s. This approach is strikingly di¤erent from traditional GATT/WTO bargaining, in which countries exchange market-access commitments through agreements to reciprocally lower import tari¤s. Traditional market-access bargaining has been successful, and the bene…ts of such a negotiation approach can be readily understood using the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. The negotiation approach taken in the Doha Round, by contrast, has fared rather poorly so far, and we argue in this section that one explanation may be that the underlying economics of this approach are less sound. We thus suggest that the liberalization of agriculture should reorient toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining.
Blustein (2009) To address this question, we begin by emphasizing that, contrary to Blustein's assertion, exchanging cuts in the export-sector subsidies of one country for cuts in the import tari¤s of another country departs from the "tradition of WTO-and GATT-style mercantilism" in a number of crucial respects. For one thing, the traditional political tradeo¤ between export interests and importcompeting interests that has characterized all previous rounds is absent. Instead, the negotiated changes produce costs (reduced subsidies) and bene…ts (lower foreign import tari¤s) for domestic export interests, with a net e¤ect that may be small or even negative. As a result, there may be no domestic group ready to push for the round. Anecdotal evidence of this possibility is also reported by Blustein:
"It was really sobering to hear the ag and NAM [National Association of Manufacturers] people say, 'Hmmm, this isn't worth the trouble,' recalls one congressional sta¤er who attended the meetings. "How would you get that passed in Congress?" (p.
270)
By contrast, traditional market-access bargaining exchanges domestic tari¤ cuts for foreign tari¤ cuts, ensuring that at least one domestic group in each country (namely, domestic exporters) is ready to push for the round. the Doha approach to agriculture as described by Blustein (2009) concerns the extent to which the negotiation may be expected to generate e¢ ciency gains and thus a potential for a mutually bene…cial agreement. As described in the preceding section, under traditional market-access bargaining in which reciprocal tari¤ cuts are exchanged, governments can enjoy mutual gains as they eliminate local-price distortions without su¤ering terms-of-trade losses. Consider now the Doha approach, under which one country reduces its export-sector subsidy in exchange for a reduction in the import tari¤ of its trading partner. The basic problem is most easily understood with reference to a pure export subsidy (i.e., a subsidy that is paid contingent on export), and when the exchange is balanced, so that the export subsidy and import tari¤ are reduced at the same rate. In this case, the net tari¤ (i.e., the import tari¤ less the export subsidy) faced by exporters is unaltered; as a consequence, the price received by exporters is unchanged, and so trade volume is una¤ected.
In fact, the sole consequence of a balanced exchange of this kind is a monetary transfer from the importing country (whose tari¤ revenue declines) to the exporting country (whose subsidy expenses decline). Clearly, a balanced exchange of this kind cannot lead to mutual gains for the negotiating countries, and from this perspective it is not surprising that an agreement has been di¢ cult to achieve using the Doha approach. 19 The described case of a balanced exchange is somewhat special, and so it is important to emphasize that our concerns with the Doha approach are not limited to this case. Consider, for example, Figure 2 , which illustrates schematically a two-country partial-equilibrium setting where 1 9 To make our points in the starkest possible way, we focus here and throughout this section on export subsidies as a particular case of the export-sector subsidies that feature prominently in Blustein's (2009) description of the Doha agriculture negotiations. More generally, these subsidies also include domestic production subsidies o¤ered in export sectors (i.e., subsidies that are paid to each unit of domestic production regardless of where it is sold), and indeed in the Doha agricultural negotiations these so-called "domestic supports" for US farmers have proven to be the most contentious. Our analysis can be extended to include domestic supports, and while the analysis then becomes more complex because the domestic production subsidy and the foreign import tari¤ imply di¤erent price distortions (and hence our "net tari¤ analysis" must be altered), the main points we emphasize throughout this section go through. Likewise, if the initial net tari¤ were positive, then trade volume would be ine¢ ciently low. In this case, a reduction in the level of export subsidization would itself lower trade volume further and could only enhance e¢ ciency if it were exchanged for an even greater reduction in the import tari¤.
There is certainly no guarantee, though, that the importing country would …nd such an exchange bene…cial.
For these reasons, we conclude that the agricultural package on the table in the Doha Round is not in the tradition of GATT-WTO market-access bargains. And the main implication of our discussion is even more pointed: the Doha approach of negotiating reductions in export-sector agricultural subsidies in exchange for reductions in agricultural import tari¤s may in fact be unworkable, because it is unlikely to lead to an agreement in which all parties to the agreement gain.
This is not to say that cuts in subsidies couldn't be part of a broader bargain in which traditional market access bargaining over tari¤s also took place. For example, in a setting where each country has a good that it exports to the other, consider a bargain in which the home country agrees to reduce its import tari¤ t and its export subsidy s in exchange for a commitment from the foreign country to reduce its import tari¤ t , as suggested schematically in Figure 3 . Such a bargain could and t imply a reduction in the net tari¤ (t s) on the foreign import good; but our point is that these gains would come in spite of the agreed reduction in s, not because of it. In this sense we suggest that e¤orts to liberalize agriculture in the Doha Round are more likely to succeed if they reorient toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining. 21 Our agriculture discussion thus far has abstracted from third-country issues, but such issues are certainly relevant for the agriculture negotiations in the Doha Round. It is therefore important to note that the simple insights that we have emphasized above extend to a multi-country setting, and in some respects are even strengthened.
To illustrate this, we now extend the basic setting depicted in Figure 3 to a three-country partial equilibrium setting, in which two of the countries utilize export subsidies but the third country does not. The pattern of trade and trade policies for each country are depicted schematically in Figure 4 .
We refer to the two countries that apply export subsidies as the EU and the US, to convey the fact that it is mainly the developed countries that o¤er subsidies to their agricultural producers, and we refer to the third country that possesses no export subsidy policies as Brazil. For the moment we continue to assume that these three countries trade two goods (plus the usual traded and untaxed numeraire good in the background of this partial equilibrium setup), with the EU exporting good y and importing good x, the US exporting good x and importing good y, and Brazil exporting both goods x and y. It is now easy to see that our earlier discussion in the two-country setting applies as well to this extended three-country setting, but with one additional complicating e¤ect: owing to Brazil's exports of x and y to the EU and the US, respectively, any net tari¤ reductions that the EU and US might negotiate in the context of also reducing their export subsidies will now cause a leakage of some of the joint surplus that their negotiations create to the third country, as Brazil enjoys rising world/export prices (i.e., its terms of trade improve). This, of course, only makes it harder for the EU and the US to …nd a way to jointly gain from a broader agreement that also cuts export-sector subsidies, and as we emphasized above any such gains would come in spite of the agreed reduction in subsidies, not because of it. 22 Finally, we note that the addition of a third country does introduce the possibility that the EU and the US could in fact gain from an agreement to reduce their export-sector subsidies, in the sense that their joint gain derives directly from their agreed restriction on subsidies rather than in spite of this agreed restriction. To see this possibility, we now introduce a third good z into the three-country partial equilibrium setting just described, and assume that good z is imported by Brazil and exported by both the EU and the US. We suppose further that Brazil applies an import tari¤ on good z while the EU and the US each subsidize the exports of z to Brazil, where the net tari¤ along each trade channel is positive. Figure 5 depicts this three-country three-good setting. Relative to our discussion just above, the novel feature here is that the EU and the US are now competing exporters (of good z) into Brazil, and absent an agreement on export subsidies they are locked in an export-subsidy competition for Brazil's market. The important new element is that an agreement between the EU and the US to restrict their export subsidies will raise the world price of good z, which by itself marks a terms-of-trade improvement for the EU and the US and can therefore o¤er a joint bene…t to these two countries. Of course, this joint bene…t comes at the expense of Brazil, who su¤ers the counterpart terms-of-trade deterioration. And it is easy to show that the bene…t that the EU and the US enjoy here marks an ine¢ cient victory of exporter interests over importer -and world -interests. Hence, while it is possible to see in this three-country three-good setting how the EU and the US could actually bene…t from an agreement to restrict their export-sector subsidies, if this describes the underlying logic of Doha's approach to agriculture then any agriculture agreement that does emerge from Doha would not advance the wider goals of the WTO membership. 23 We are therefore left with a pessimistic view of the Doha approach to agriculture negotiations when this approach is evaluated on its own merits. Nevertheless, taking a broader perspective and viewing the attempts to limit subsidies within the wider context of the challenges associated with integrating the less-developed-country members into the world trading system, it is possible to interpret the e¤orts to limit agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round as playing a useful role in helping to address the issues associated with "latecomers"to the GATT/WTO bargaining table as we described these issues in section 2. We turn to this interpretation next.
Making the Doha Round a Development Round
We have suggested above that the success of the Doha Round as a Development Round may hinge on moving away from the non-reciprocal SDT norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO. Rather, if developing countries are to share in the gains from GATT/WTO market access negotiations, we have argued that they must come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed countries. We have also suggested that in the context of the Doha Round the WTO may be facing a critical challenge associated with the problem of "latecomers"to the GATT/WTO bargaining table, in that developed countries at this point may have preserved an inadequate amount of bargaining power with which to engage developing countries in reciprocal bargains; and in addition a kind of "globalization fatigue" may be present in the developed world whereby the existing MFN tari¤ levels of developed countries may be too low for a world in which developing countries are fully integrated into the world trading system. And we have indicated that, in theory, to address this problem developed countries might need to renegotiate (upward) their existing tari¤ commitments in order to "make room at the table" and accommodate the entry of developing countries into the world trading system. Finally, we have observed that, when evaluated on its own merits, the Doha approach to agricultural negotiations and its emphasis on the reduction of export-enhancing agricultural subsidies in exchange for cuts in import tari¤s seems suspect on economic grounds.
We now suggest that, when viewed from the wider perspective of the Doha Round's central goal of integrating the WTO's developing country members into the world trading system, the emphasis on reducing and eliminating agricultural export-sector subsidies might itself be reinterpreted as an initiative that could help "make room at the table"for developing countries, and can in this way be interpreted as a coherent part of this broader whole. In particular, a Doha Round that (i) engages developing countries to come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed countries, and, as part of the bargain, (ii) reduces and/or eliminates the agricultural export-sector subsidies of developed countries, could be viewed as a way to engineer trade volume gains for developing country members while using the reduction/elimination of agricultural subsidies both as a bargaining chip to entice developing countries to agree to lower their tari¤s, thereby generating bargaining power for the "low-tari¤" developed world, and as a device to mitigate the overall trade e¤ects of integrating developing countries into the world trading system, thereby addressing the issue of developed-world "globalization fatigue."
That is, if the developed world is struggling with how to handle the latecomers problem, then the negotiated reduction in agricultural export-sector subsidies might be seen as a way to address that problem.
This point can be seen both from the perspective of the general equilibrium model that we sketched in section 2, and from the partial equilibrium perspectives developed in section 3. From a general equilibrium perspective, the point derives from the observation that an import tari¤ acts like an export tax once its general equilibrium impacts are accounted for, which is why as we have described in section 2 a cut in a country's own tari¤s, in raising the volume of its imports, will also stimulate its exports, acting much like the introduction of a program of export subsidies. By the same token, a cut in a country's own export subsidies, in reducing the volume of its exports, will also contract its imports, acting much like an increase in the country's import tari¤s. Viewed in this light, a Doha agreement to reduce/eliminate the agricultural export-sector subsidies of the developed countries can "make room at the table" and accommodate the entry of developing countries into the world trading system, because it will have much the same e¤ect as if developed countries (say, the home country and foreign country 1 in Figure 1 ) had instead renegotiated (upward) their existing tari¤ commitments. 24 Hence, the negotiated reduction in agricultural subsidies might be seen as helping to address the latecomers problem.
To see the same point from a partial equilibrium perspective, it is useful to refer back to Figure   5 . There it is clear, for example, that a cut in s U S x , the US export subsidy on good x, would help reorient EU imports of good x away from US exporters and toward Brazil exporters, at the same time that it would (i) reduce overall import volume of good x into the EU, and (ii) raise the price received by Brazil exporters of good x. Similarly, a cut in s EU y , the EU export subsidy on good y, would help reorient US imports of good y away from EU exporters and toward Brazil exporters, at the same time that it would (i) reduce overall import volume of good y into the US, and (ii) raise the price received by Brazil exporters of good y. Clearly, these cuts in export subsidies could then (i) help address "globalization fatigue" in the EU and US by mitigating the overall trade e¤ects of reciprocal tari¤ cuts negotiated between the EU and Brazil and between the US and Brazil, and (ii) if o¤ered as a carrot to Brazil in exchange for tari¤ cuts from Brazil, could serve as an extra bargaining chip for use by the "low-tari¤"/developed countries EU and US in their reciprocal tari¤ bargains with Brazil. Hence, from this partial equilibrium perspective as well, it is clear that the negotiated reduction in agricultural export subsidies might be seen as helping to address the latecomers problem. 25 Two further points follow from this discussion. First, as is apparent from the partial equilibrium perspective of Figure 5 , the negotiated reduction in agricultural subsidies would be most e¤ective in addressing the latecomers problem for developing countries that are large exporters of agricultural products. Hence, negotiated reductions in developed country agricultural subsidies may be an especially powerful instrument for helping to accommodate Brazil's integration into the world trading system, but perhaps less so with regard to China or India. 26 And second, it should be clear from this discussion that the bargain we have outlined here is fundamentally multilateral, in that it cannot be broken down into a series of bilateral bargains that is each mutually bene…cial 2 5 It is also interesting to note that the e¤ort to reduce/eliminate export-enhancing agricultural subsidies and the e¤ort to more fully integrate developing countries into the world trading system are being attempted in the same round of GATT/WTO negotiations. There could of course be many reasons for this, but the interpretation we o¤er here is one of them.
2 6 More speci…cally, and with reference to Figure 5 , in the absence of SDT there are three strategies that would become available for a developed country such as the United States to negotiate reductions in the tari¤s of a developing country such as Brazil. First, to the extent that Brazil is the traditional principal supplier of a good (say, good y in Figure 5 ) into the US market, the existing US tari¤ on this good is likely to be ine¢ ciently high as a result of the GATT/WTO's historical reliance on SDT, and the United States can then engage Brazil in standard reciprocal market access negotiations o¤ering cuts in the US tari¤ on imports of good y in exchange for cuts in Brazil's tari¤ (say, on imports of good z in Figure 5 ). This …rst strategy may be available with regard to developed country markets such as textiles and apparel, certain agricultural products, and footwear (though on the possible di¢ culties of applying this strategy for textiles and apparel see note 14). Second, for agricultural goods where the United States and Brazil are competing exporters into developed country markets such as the EU (say, good x in Figure 5 ), the United States can o¤er reductions in agricultural subsidies to Brazil in exchange for cuts in Brazil's tari¤ (on imports of good z in Figure 5 ), as we have described in the text. These negotiations could bene…t both the United States and Brazil, though the EU could be hurt without further multilateral policy adjustments. And third, for non-agricultural goods where a developed country such as the EU is the traditional principal supplier into the US market (say, good y in Figure 5 ) and where US tari¤s are likely to be low as a result of commitments made in previous rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations, the United States could in principle renegotiate with the EU on the treatment of good y, with the United States raising its tari¤ binding and the EU lowering its export subsidy, so that the United States could then engage Brazil in standard reciprocal market access negotiations o¤ering cuts in the US tari¤ on imports of good y in exchange for cuts in Brazil's tari¤ (on imports of good z in Figure 5 ). Once again, the EU could be hurt without further multilateral policy adjustments. In theory, this third strategy provides a direct way to address the latecomers problem and allow developing countries to be integrated into the world trading system where the …rst two strategies are unavailable, though in practice the prospect of tari¤ renegotiations between developed countries raises a host of issues from which our simple theoretical treatment abstracts, which is why we present this third possibility as of mostly pedagogical value.
to the parties involved. This is an inherent feature of any solution to the latecomers problem as we have described that problem above, and it creates a special challenge for an institution such as the GATT/WTO with a long history of solving problems via a collection of largely bilateral and mutually bene…cial bargains.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the one key change in the substance of the current approach to Doha Round negotiations that is required for the economic interpretation that we have sketched above to hold together: SDT must be rejected, and developing countries (Brazil in Figure 5 ) must come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and o¤er reciprocal tari¤ cuts of their own. Absent tari¤ cuts from developing countries, the analysis we have sketched above cannot lend support to the basic Doha approach to negotiations. 27 
Conclusion
A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. The 2001 declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, commits the member governments to negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access with a view to phasing out export subsidies, while embracing special and di¤erential treatment for developing countries as an integral part of all elements of the negotiations.
The main message of this paper comes in three parts. First, these stated aims are incompatible from the perspective of our economic analysis; thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks. Second, in attempting to integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, the WTO may face a "latecomers" problem that, while occurring also in earlier rounds, is unprecedented in its scale in the Doha Round, and which could potentially account for the current impasse. And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the non-reciprocal special-and-di¤erential treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha, to address the latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.
We close with two …nal observations. First, our diagnosis of the underlying reason for the current stalemate in the Doha Round has much in common with the views expressed in a recent speech by WTO Director General Pascal Lamy on this point:
"In trade matters, we need to address competing views among governments as to 2 7 The other change we have suggested above -that the agriculture negotiations, which are currently focused on negotiating reductions in agricultural export-enhancing subsidies in exchange for reductions in agricultural import tari¤s, should be reoriented toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining -can from the perspective we o¤er here be seen less as a change of substance than a change in emphasis and interpretation within a broader package, because within this broader package export-enhancing subsidies are still cut, but the purpose of an agreement to reduce these subsidies is now solely to facilitate market access (i.e., tari¤) negotiations between developed and developing countries.
what constitutes a fair distribution of rights and obligations within the trading system. Before the WTO was established in 1995 there was, in broad terms, an arrangement whereby developed countries agreed to open their markets, while more emphasis was placed on special and di¤erential treatment for developing countries. Developing countries were not called upon to open their markets in a substantial manner. This arrangement re ‡ected basic di¤erences in development levels and capacities.
"Over time, the di¤erences between developed and at least some developing countries have narrowed, and with it the rather simple dichotomy upon which the GATT trading system rested. As developing-country growth has outstripped developed-country growth and the gap has narrowed, it is becoming harder to …nd a balance of rights and obligations that is regarded as legitimate and fair in the eyes of all parties concerned.
These tensions had already begun to manifest themselves well before the creation of the WTO and China's accession, but they have clearly increased since.
"Underlying all this is the question of what constitutes reciprocity. For some, the emerging economies have attained a level of competitiveness and e¢ ciency in key sectors that warrants treating reciprocity as parity in obligations. Others emphasize that emerging economies still face formidable development challenges in many areas of their economies and are still far from enjoying the per capita income levels and standard of living of those in industrialized economies. In this world, it is argued, treating reciprocity as equality of obligations is not appropriate, fails to meet a fairness standard, and handicaps development policies.
"It is not my role as Director-General to take a position on this issue, but in many ways, it is this that has made it impossible for us so far to reach agreement on a big package of new regulations of world trade in the Doha Round." (WTO, 2011) .
Achieving a shared diagnosis of the problems that have led to the impasse at Doha is crucial if WTO-member governments are to move forward on a solution to that impasse. Our economic analysis provides strong support for the views expressed by Director General Lamy in this regard.
At the same time, our analysis suggests a possible bridge between the opposing positions described by Director General Lamy regarding what constitutes "a fair distribution of rights and obligations within the trading system": such a bridge might be built, not by equating reciprocity with a "parity in obligations" per se (though that could be the outcome of reciprocal negotiations), but rather by building on the way that developed countries have traditionally harnessed reciprocity in their GATT/WTO market access negotiations with each other and …nding ways to harness reciprocity as a means to achieve meaningful market access commitments for emerging/developing economies as well.
And …nally, we note that the relatively successful experience of the negotiations regarding the revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the text of which is now agreed in principle, is potentially relevant for the arguments we have put forward above. 28 In particular, as 2 8 We thank our discussant Robert Anderson for bringing this negotiation to our attention and providing the relevant Anderson (2011) describes, in their GPA negotiations WTO-member governments have adopted a novel approach to SDT that allows reciprocity to be maintained in the negotiations between developed and developing countries. If our arguments are correct, this feature of the GPA negotiations, in combination with the fact that the GPA negotiations did not start from a substantial asymmetry of commitments across existing developed and developing country members and so did not face the kind of "latecomers" problem that we have argued confronts the Doha Round negotiators, may help to explain the relative success achieved by the GPA negotiators as compared to that achieved to date in the Doha Round.
mapping to our analysis. Source: GATT (1994) .
